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his issue of EAP begins our 15th year. We
thank the 61 readers who have renewed their
subscriptions and include reminders for
those who have not yet renewed.
This issue begins with a review of Patterns of
Home, a new book by architects Max Jacobson,
Murray Silverstein, and Barbara Winslow. Next,
educator John Cameron considers philosopher’s J.
E. Malpas’ Place and Experience as it has significance for environmental ethics and place education.
Finally, architect David Wang draws on the philosophers Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Immanuel Kant
to explore the nature of artistic creativity.

SQUARE HOUSE

www.arch.ksu.edu/seamon/EAP.html Winter ▪ 2004

Enhanced EAP Website
Thanks to Kansas State University computer science graduate student Nagini Indugula, our EAP
website has been updated and substantially enhanced. The cumulative index is now complete
through 2003, and we have added webpage versions
of many essays and book reviews from past issues.
Also provided is a comprehensive review, by EAP
editor David Seamon, of recent phenomenological
and related qualitative research dealing with environmental, architectural, and place issues. Go to:
www.arch.ksu.edu/seamon/EAP.html.

LONG THIN HOUSE

HOUSE WITH WINGS

Above: Conceptual drawings from Patterns of Home by Max Jacobson, Murray Silverstein, & Barbara Winslow (Newtown, CT: Taunton Press, 2002, p. 102). Arguing that light coming into rooms from two sides is integral to good house design, the authors describe simple ways to incorporate this element architecturally. Left, a
simple four-square house allowing light into two sides of each corner room; center, a long thin house, allowing
light to enter from opposite sides of most rooms; and, right, a house with wings creating rooms with the potential for light on two or three sides. See review, p. 3. Drawings © 2002 Taunton Press.
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Donors, 2004

of respect and openness to the various manifestations of truth in human experience; it strives to foster understanding through meditative thinking, narrative structure, and poetic imagination. Like the
Janus head reliefs found over the doorways of old
Roman homes, this journal, too, is situated at a
threshold. The space within this journal, like the
space beyond the Janus head relief, is a space where
dwelling can occur, where thinking can take place,
and where community can be built.” .P.O. Box
7914, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15216-0914;
www.janushead.org/jhinfo.cfm.

We are grateful to the following readers who have
contributed more than the base subscription for
2004. Our membership is fragile, and we could not
continue without your support. Thank you all.
David Adams
Tom Barrie
Alfred Bay
Roxanne Bok
Andrew Cohill
L. J. Evenden
Kirk Gastinger
Gus Glaser
Jim Jones
David Kermani
Ted Lowitz
Ricardo Nemirovsky
Marina Pecar
Carolyn Prorok
Mark Rosenbaum
David Saile
Harvey Sherman
Anthony Weston

Camille Archer
Aina Barten
Rosemarie Bogner
Margaret Boschetti
Pam Cole
Eduard Führ
Marie Gee
Sara Isakawa
Michael Kazanjian
Evelyn Koblentz
Mark Miller
Shierry Nicholson
Martha Perez
Miles Richardson
Tom Saarinen
R. Murray Schafer
Ray Weisenburger
Justin Winkler

Membership News
Chicago Architect Mark Miller recently presented
a talk on “Zen in the Art of Architecture” for the
lecture series, “The Emerging Horizon,” sponsored
by the AIA Chicago Health Professional Interest
Area. A major issue that he addressed was whether
the Eastern philosophies that underpin many alternative medical therapies can be integrated into architecture itself. mark@zenplusarchitecture.com.

Items of Interest

Ray Weisenburger, Professor of Planning and Architecture at Kansas State University, writes: “I subscribe to about ten journals and receive another 20
or so that are free—some very good ones. However,
your journal is the only one I read from cover to
cover. I particularly liked the recent “Travel Drawing” article, although drawing is not a recreational
activity in my mind. My Urban Visual Analysis
class focuses on drawing as a way to understand the
structure and content of a community or neighborhood—not just to put a “picture” in our
sketchbooks. Later on the author says may things I
agree with. Keep up the good work.” rbw@ksu.edu

The seminar, “Radical Prince: The Integral Vision of HRH the Prince of Wales,” will be held 114 March 2004, at Frenchman’s Cove, Port Antonio,
Jamaica. The seminar will include a focus on Prince
Charles’ continuing interest in architecture, including Christopher Alexander’s work. Writer and philosopher David Lorimer will lead the seminar, held
on a private estate located on the northeast coast of
Jamaica. Contact: lainnes@gonuts4free.com.
Interdisciplinary Environmental Review is an international journal that publishes research and survey papers, from all disciplines, concerning the
natural environment. The journal is sponsored by
the Interdisciplinary Environmental Association,
whose mission is to “bring together all disciplines
so that our understanding of environmental issues is
enhanced through interdisciplinary communication.” Contact: Prof. Kevin Hickey, Economics
Dept., Assumption College, 500 Salisbury St.,
Worcester, MA 01609; khickey@assumption.edu.

University of Michigan School of Art & Design’s
Jack Williamson sends news of Design Biz, a webbased educational initiative that brings together
businesspeople, designers, and students interested in
the ways that good design can help and be helped
by business. A summary of the work is provided in
DesigninBuz: Furthering the Synergy between
Business and Design—a Model for Community
Building on the Web. To receive a copy, contact Williamson at: jhwill@umich.edu.

Janus Head, an on-line and paper journal published
twice a year, is devoted to “maintaining an attitude
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Book Review
Max Jacobson, Murray Silverstein, & Barbara Winslow, 2002. Patterns of Home: The Ten Essentials of Enduring Design. Taunton, CT: Taunton Press.

A

•

uthors of the earlier The Good House: Contrast as a Design Tool [Taunton Press,
1990; reviewed in EAP, fall 1991], These
three architects aim in this useful new book to identify and to illustrate the central qualities that make a
house “a truly wonderful place to live” (p. 3).
After designing many houses themselves and
analyzing other home designs that are “memorable,
satisfying, and enduring” (p. 8), the authors arrive at
ten patterns that they claim underlie and sustain a
thorough sense of at-homeness. These patterns,
summarized in the box, next page, are said to:

•
•

Shaping each opening to suit the climate and
activities that will be lit by the opening;
Creating window places like bays and window
seats to enhance the life of the house;
Using shading devices to control the light and
heat entering the house.

For example, in regard to allowing light in each
room from two sides, the drawings on this EAP’s
front page illustrate some possibilities for differently shaped houses—the rectangular house, for
which each corner room has the potential for windows on two sides; or the long thin house or house
with long wings, both house forms affording the
possibility of windows on opposite walls.

link the way the house is designed with the way we experience
the world. They explore the presence of light, the way we
move through a space, the feel of one space as you are sitting
in another, the relationship of indoors and outdoors (p. 9).

Commentary

After an introductory chapter overviewing the
ten patterns and discussing how they were established and how they might be used practically, the
authors elaborate the patterns in ten chapters well
illustrated with built examples taken from the authors’ own architectural practice or from the home
designs of other architects.
Each chapter presents a pattern in broad terms,
then identifies several practical ways in which that
pattern can be designed for and grounded architecturally. For instance, in the chapter on “capturing
light,” the authors emphasize design elements that
include the following:
• Locating the house on its site so that the building receives light throughout the day;
• Shaping the house so that light can enter important rooms from at least two sides;
• Using light from skylights or clerestories when
light from a second side is not possible;
• Placing rooms in such a way that they receive
light at the time of day when most important activities occur there;

From a phenomenological perspective, perhaps the
most valuable aspect of Patterns is the authors’ effort to hold tight to the lived relationship between
people and world as, in this case, that relationship
infuses, through house and home, an experience
of centeredness, contentment, and deep personal
and family identity.
If one accepts the central phenomenological
principle that home, working rightly, resolves a series of lived dialectics like rest/movement, center/horizon, dwelling/journey, inside/outside, and
privacy/publicness, then one can say that all ten patterns contribute in some fashion toward resolution
through the participation and support of the built
world—viz., a well designed house.
For example, “creating rooms,” “sheltering
roof,” and “private edges, common core” all help to
establish and enhance a sense of center and rest so
that the individual, couple, or family unit can identify, remember, and strengthen their sense of athomeness and selfhood. On the other hand, the patterns “inhabiting the site,” and “refuge and pros-
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pect” do more to mediate the centering quality of
home with its larger context of natural setting,
neighborhood, natural landscape, and views.
Yet again, patterns like “capturing light,” “parts
in proportion,” “places in between,” and “composing with materials” work more like a physical and
aesthetic bond that holds the home’s centering and
reaching qualities together, making them a built and
lived whole that contributes architecturally to the
continual, lived resolution of home’s inescapable
dialectical nature. In short, good design, through the
reconciling potential of the patterns, can help resolve home’s lived dialectics and transform an unavoidable “struggle” of opposites into lived relationship. House becomes home and environment
becomes place.
As this newsletter has regularly argued, too
much of the phenomenological research on place
and human dwelling emphasizes the person aspect
of the person-world relationship with little awareness or concern with how the world—particularly
its physical and built dimensions—also plays a crucial role in shaping lifeworld and place. Patterns is
important because it gives most attention to these
environmental and built qualities and thus helps
demonstrate how they constitute an integral part of
what the world as lived is about.
One critical concern I have about the book is
how directly, in the houses illustrated, the architects
have actually used the patterns in the house designs.
Some of the homes chosen are the authors’ own
work, which indicates a direct use of the patterns in
the design process. By far, however, the over 30
houses providing pattern illustrations are the work
of other architects who more than likely had no direct notion of “patterns” and no doubt designed
their houses in the typical formalist-visual way that
dominates architectural practice today. If the idea of
patterns was not used in designing these houses, is it
really that useful a design tool?
At the same time, one wishes that the authors
might have included at least a few examples of
houses poorly designed from the vantage point of
the ten patterns and then considered whether these
patterns really help demonstrate why the houses
work badly as homes.
There is also a question concerning the many
house photographs, which are beautiful aesthetically

The Ten Essential Patterns
1. Inhabiting the site
Think of the house and its site as a single thing but
also as parts shaped by a larger environment.

2. Creating rooms, outside and in
Buildings give shape to their interior spaces but also
to the exterior spaces around them.

3. Sheltering roof
One of the defining comforts of home is the feeling
of being enveloped by a simple, sloping roof.

4. Capturing light
A home must open itself to the light and warmth of
the sun.

5. Parts in proportion
A home is an assembly of parts, materials, and
spaces. In some graceful, rhythmic way, these parts
must make an orderly and sensible whole.

6. The flow through rooms
How we arrive on a site and enter the house and
move through it has a profound influence on our
sense of the building as home.

7. Private edges, common core
Against the flow of movement, rooms are meant to
hold activity, to gather the life of the home.

8. Refuge and outlook
One of the abiding pleasures that home offers is being in and looking out—providing a solid, stable, and
protected place from which you can look out toward
and over a larger “beyond.”

9. Places in between
The house needs places where one can pause, leave
the mainstream, enjoy quiet eddies along the margins.

10. Composing with materials
Envision a melody—materials that support and underscore; those that offer counterpoint, slow the progression—all with a view to letting the house sing.
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to know if the patterns illustrated in the houses actually evoke, in the daily lives of the occupants, the
kinds of environmental experiences claimed by the
patterns.
In short, one would like to know how at least a
few of these houses really work as physical contexts
for human worlds and whether the built parts arise
from and evoke the patterns with which they are
identified.
This concern, however, is the quibble of a phenomenologist who believes that, eventually, any
presentation arguing a link between human and
built worlds must verify that link in terms of real
peoples’ doings in real built environments.
As architects, these authors have done more
than enough by providing a valuable house-making
tool that should motivate both lay people and designers to better envision homes that are places of
life, graciousness, and comfort.
Particularly, the book should be considered as a
required text in lower-level architectural studios,
where students are too often subjected to a design
pedagogy that reduces place making to sterile, aesthetic form making.

and appear like the standard stunning illustrations
that one finds in glossy architectural magazines and
journals—a portrayal of houses that are perfectly
ordered and with few indications that real people
actually live in these places and transform them into
the lived messiness of homes in their day-to-day
ordinariness.
Two of the book’s authors worked with Christopher Alexander to write the original 1977 Pattern
Language and, in this regard, it is instructive to set
Patterns next to the recently-published second volume of Alexander’s Nature of Order (The Process
of Making Life, Berkeley, CA: Center for Environmental Structure, 2002). Few if any of the several
house designs that Alexander illustrates in that work
have the formalistic perfection or magazine elegance of the houses illustrated in Patterns. In fact,
most of Alexander’s house designs appear downright crude and filled with an awkwardness, both
architectural and lived, that Alexander calls “roughness”—a kind of intentional inexactitude that he
claims contributes to the life and wholeness of the
design.
There is little of this roughness in the houses
displayed in Patterns and that is not necessarily a
weakness, though we are given very little evidence

—David Seamon

Some Implications of Malpas’ Place and
Experience for Place Ethics and Education
John I. Cameron
Cameron is a faculty member in the program in Social Ecology at the University of Western Sydney. This commentary is based on excerpts from a longer article, “Educating for Place Responsiveness: An Australian Perspective on Ethical Practice,” to be published later this year in the academic journal Ethics, Place and Environment. j.cameron@uws.edu.au. © 2004 John I. Cameron.

J

E. Malpas’ Place and Experience (Malpas
1999) is part of a renewal of attention to the
subject of place by philosophers (Casey 1993,
1997) and, more recently, by writers on environmental ethics (Stefanovic 2000, Smith 2001).
I had occasion to review Malpas’ work while reflecting upon the ethical and educational implica-

tions of place-responsiveness work I have been undertaking in Australia. By “place-responsive,” I
mean a society whose institutions and customs nurture and support a rich, deep connection with land
and place (Cameron 2001; Plumwood 2000).
As an educator committed to the goal of moving
towards a place-responsive society, I have been ac-
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enced, but that it is the complex structure of place
itself that makes experience, any human experience,
possible at all.
He carefully maps this structure of place by
surveying the interconnected elements that are contained within it – objective and subjective space,
self-subjectivity and other-subjectivity, memory and
mental states (thoughts, feelings, experiences), action and narrative. He draws out the structural interdependencies of all these elements within place, for
example, how memories are nested within each
other the way places are nested within other places
with multiple and overlapping connections.
Neither objective nor subjective space can be
grasped without the possibility of the other, and
both are required for the intersubjective space
opened up between two people encountering the
same object. The narrative structuring of mental
states constitutes the self and the possibility of
agency. Actions are nested in personal projects that
are nested in larger narratives that structure place
and are structured by place. As a result:

tively involved in engendering place responsiveness
with university students, conference participants,
and other members of the public. Through running
experientially-oriented courses on sense of place,
national colloquia on place, and researching with
local community members, I have sought to foster
an inclusive love of place as a deep motivation for
an environmental ethic.
Coming into this work from a conservationist
background and being motivated by a strong environmental ethic has sometimes been a challenge. It
has led to three major questions of ethical practice:
•
•
•

Does it generate positive environmental and social outcomes?
How to bring depth experience and critical thinking together?
How to engage with indigenous knowledge?

The philosophical topography traversed by Malpas, especially when considered in combination with
Stefanovic’s (2000) place-based ethics, has helped me
think about these questions constructively.

To have a sense of one’s own identity….is to have a sense, not
of some simple underlying self that is one’s own, but rather of
a particular place in the world. While the having of such a
sense of place consists in having a grasp of a conceptually
complex structure – a structure that encompasses different
forms of spatiality, concepts of self, of others and of an objective order of things – it is also a sense of place that is necessarily articulated linguistically (p. 152).

Place and Experience
In Place and Experience, Malpas (1999) does not
mention directly the word ‘ethics’, but makes such a
thorough investigation of the philosophy of place
from first principles that it provides a substantial
basis for examination of my place responsiveness
work.
Malpas contends that much writing about place
misses the point by effectively describing place as
human response to physical surroundings as distinct
from mere location in objective space. In books
such as Tuan’s Topophilia (1974), ‘it is not place as
such that is important, but just the idea of human
responsiveness – a responsiveness that need not itself be grounded in any concept of place or locality
at all’ (Malpas, 1999, p. 30). I have encountered this
phenomenon also in those students who lost sight of
the place itself in the intensity of the personal experiences the encounter with place triggered.
The best way to describe the relationship between place and experience, Malpas suggests, is not
to talk of the experience of place as if place were
one of a number of things that could be experi-

While Malpas notes in conclusion that he has
not directly discussed the practical, moral, and political implications of his work, he has provided a
framework within which they might be considered.
For example, he suggests that ‘the complex structure of place…..suggest[s] that the idea of place
does not so much bring a certain politics with it, as
define the very frame within which the political itself must be located’ (p. 198). If we substitute ‘ethics’ for ‘politics’ in that sentence, it reads just as satisfactorily as a basis for rethinking ethics.
Malpas’ exposition of the complex structure of
place itself illuminates why rediscovering childhood
sense of place became important for my students.
Childhood memories of place are not merely an interesting side issue, far less to be dismissed as nostalgia. They are critical to self-identity, to the narra-
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These abilities can be cultivated in a variety of
ways, and it is a worthy thing to do, but it’s only
half the battle. The other half is to acknowledge the
particular quality of the structure of place; any
place, that is, and not just special sites. The challenge, perhaps, is to give practical expression to the
view that the idea of place redefines the very frame
within which education itself must be located.

tives we develop about our lives, and to our capacity for self-reflection (pp 182-183).
Malpas also notes that as we age, such places
and memories become increasingly significant to
us, according to psychological studies of autobiographical memory. It may be no coincidence that
most of my students and members of the colloquium are mature-aged, often in their forties or fifties, and it suggests that education for place responsiveness should prioritize work with childhood
place memories, especially when working with mature-aged people.
Malpas’ emphasis on the primacy of narrative
in structuring experiences, a sense of self, taking
action in the world, and place itself provides a philosophical foundation for working with story in
place education (Cameron, Mulligan & Wheatly
2003; Hay 2001; Mulligan 2003). In addition to
validating my use of ‘a storied sense of place’ in
classes and workshops, his work suggests the value
of exploring the interconnections between self,
place, and action.
It is not simply a matter of place containing and
being structured by stories – our very sense of who
we are as individuals is a narrative connected intimately with place, Malpas says, and the possibility
of our being able to take action is structured by narrative and place. Thus there may be value in encouraging students to consider notions of selfhood
and capacity for action in narrative terms, and then
relate those stories to significant places in their lives
– something that some of them have done already.
More generally for education, Malpas’ work
suggests that whatever else place education does, it
must begin to draw out the consequences of place
being the structure that enables any human experiencing to occur. Place education becomes broadened and deepened by the understanding that coming to terms with the structures of our dwelling
places, past and present, enables us to grasp how we
structure our lives and sense of ourselves, as individuals and as members of a culture.
As Malpas’ critique of Tuan implies, it is not
enough to treat place as a vehicle for developing
human responsiveness – the ability to listen, to engage deeply in relationship with other beings, to
open the imagination and all the physical senses to
another, and so on.

Towards an Ethic of Place
Malpas’ work, viewed in this way, might provide a
philosophical grounding for Ingrid Stefanovic’s
(2000) place-based ethics that was recently reviewed in this newsletter by Kenneth Maly (2001).
She is one of several recent writers who have explicitly considered what an ethics of place or a philosophy of place and experience might be (Callicott
1994; Fox 1990; Plumwood 1003, 2002; Salleh
1997; Singer 1975).
In rethinking sustainability, Stefanovic introduces the notion of ‘place’ into environmental ethics. She arrives at a place-based ethic that ‘aims to
guide us in our actions, not through the imposition
of static principles and rules, but instead by teaching the meaning of attunement to a balanced fitting
relation between human beings and their world’ (p.
117). This ethic ‘respects the bonds that tie us to our
dwelling places but [is] one that allows for continuing dialogue as we collectively reflect on environmental questions of right and wrong’ (p. 135).
Because I have journeyed through environmentalism to the phenomenology of place, I am particularly interested in Stefanovic’s attempt to bring
phenomenology to environmental ethics. It is noteworthy that she advocates an ethic that provides
guidance through teaching the meaning of attunement and right relationship with the world.
She establishes the centrality of educational
processes in a place-based ethics, and thus demonstrates the significance of place responsiveness
work for an understanding of what an ethics of
place might be in practice. She includes a section on
phenomenology and environmental education that
considers how to promote grounded ecological values, and takes up the relationship between critical
thinking and place awareness.
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being able to hold the power of people’s experiences and expressed needs as well as the conflict.
The latter confirms our experience in the local research and the colloquia, and the former is a valuable addition to the criteria for successful placebased processes.

In his review of Stefanovic’s book, Maly
(2001) draws out the tension in her work between
attunement to being-in-place and environmental
questions of right and wrong. Calling for an ethic to
do both these things might be considered to be
glossing over the inherent difficulties, except for the
fact that Stefanovic provided specific examples of
how this might be done.
Her third case study is particularly informative
and describes involving the community of Short
Hills Park in developing a ‘bottom-up’ environmental code of ethics for the park. She discusses her
role as a phenomenologist in drawing out converging images of the park as well as critically analysing
the value-laden and conflicting claims of participants. She concludes that:

Narratives of Place
Narrative emerges from this discussion as a ‘central
organizing principle’ of place and identity, although
as Malpas reminds us, place both structures and is
structured by narrative. The narratives that are embedded in a culture’s landscapes and memory can be
viewed both as stories that connect us and stories
that make us different. Each point of view is helpful
in breaking down the potential for local place relationships to be devalued by the experience of extraordinary places that appear to have their own
special characteristics.
The fact that all places and all cultures have
their narratives (about how country came into being
and is maintained, how humans and non-humans are
related, how conflicts are resolved, and so on) might
be a starting point for a discussion about which narratives are dominant and why, and whether new narratives can be enacted.
Critical environmental and social awareness is
clearly important to an ethical process that can occur at many different levels, from a code of ethics
for a local park to national debates on reconciliation
and place – which of the stories we tell ourselves
and implicitly live by, or would like to live by, are
more likely to lead to ecological sustainability and
the flourishing of difference?
The central role for place education in any
movement towards a sustainable society has been
well established by Stefanovic. The tension in educational practice between facilitation of deep place
experiences and reflecting upon them while maintaining critical awareness of their broader environmental and social implications, proves to be a significant and creative tension in the emerging field of
place ethics.
Individual and collective learning need to take
place, from experience and critical awareness of the
structural issues, and both have to be included in an
ethical place education.

the iterative process of evolving a code of ethics for Short
Hills Park does suggest the possibility that ethics is neither a
linear product of philosophical theorizing nor merely a sociological accumulation of viewpoints. Rather, what emerged on
this project was a role for philosophy of mediating between
concrete place-based needs and critical thinking about the
broader implications of how best to collectively reconcile
those needs (p 169-170).

If the place-based needs are understood to arise
from attunement to being-in-place, and the need for
mediation stems out of critical thinking about different experiences and values regarding the park,
then Stefanovic is working with the same dynamic
between experience and critical awareness that I
have been raising.
It is interesting to note that it is not a simple
oppositional dynamic. As her discussion of education reveals, critical thinking about taken-forgranted experience is required in order for students
to move beyond the ‘natural attitude’. That is, depth
experience and critical awareness are in creative
tension, sometimes necessary for each other, sometimes apparently pulling students in different directions. Stefanovic’s case study provides an example
of how to work with this tension in a practical ethical setting.
It is significant that it was an iterative process,
requiring the moving back and forth between identifying images and needs and reflecting upon emerging conflicts. It also was a mediated activity, necessitating someone outside the immediate community
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Cameron J. (2003) Responding to place in a postcolonial era: An Australian perspective, in Adams,
W. and Mulligan, M., eds., Decolonising Nature,
Earthscan, London.
Cameron, J., Mulligan, M. and Wheatley, V. (2003)
Building a place-responsive society through inclusive local projects and networks, paper accepted for
publication in Local Environment [forthcoming].
Casey, E. (1993) Getting Back into Place, Indiana
University Press, Bloomington, Indiana.
Casey, E. (1997) The Fate of Place, University of
California Press, Berkeley, California.
Fox, W. (1990) Toward a Transpersonal Ecology,
Shambhala, Boston
Hay, P. (2001) Writing Place: Unpacking an Art Exhibition Catalogue Essay in Cameron, J. ed., Changing
Places: Reimagining Sense of Place in Australia,
University of Western Sydney, Richmond.
Malpas, J. (1999) Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Maly, K. (2001) Finding a way to rethink sustainability, Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology Newsletter, vol. 12, no. 2, pp 12-15.
Mulligan, M. (2003) Feet to the ground in storied
landscapes, in Adams, W. and Mulligan, M., eds.,
Decolonising Nature, Earthscan, London.
Plumwood, V. (1993) Feminism and the Mastery of
Nature, Routledge, London.
Plumwood, V. (2000) Belonging, naming and decolonisation, Ecopolitics, 1(1), 90-106.
Plumwood, V. (2002) Environmental Culture: The
Ecological Crisis of Reason, Routledge, London.
Salleh, A. (1997) Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature,
Marx and the Postmodern, Zed, London.
Singer, P. (1975) Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for
the Treatment of our Animals, Random House, New
York.
Smith, M. (2001) An Ethics of Place: Radical Ecology, Postmodernity and Social Theory, SUNY
Press, Albany, New York.
Stefanovic, I. (2000) Safeguarding our Common Future, SUNY Press, Albany, New York.
Tuan, Y-F. (1974) Topophilia, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

A way forward is suggested by Stefanovic’s
mediated iterative process for group work and the
suspension of outcome orientation and judgment to
allow the experience to speak for itself prior to
critical reflection for individual work.
Malpas observes that it is insufficient to use
place experiences in an education for general human responsiveness. By implication, a genuine,
ethical place education must enable students to
learn the ways in which place itself makes human
experience possible. A starting point is to accord
childhood place memories greater significance in
educational development and self-understanding.
An equally important step is to make more conscious those personal and cultural narratives that
often subconsciously structure our sense of personal
identity and sense of place. Such educational initiatives, like the practical experience of philosophers
such as Stefanovic with local park residents, will
assist in working through what an ethics of place
might be in practice.
This review of Malpas’ work and its connection
with Stefanovic’s research has focused only on its
implications for place ethics and education. If indeed it is the complex structuring of place itself that
makes any human experience possible at all, the
implications for all fields of human endeavour are
profound. This is not a simple deterministic view
that we are creatures of place, but an understanding
of the structural interdependencies of subjectivity,
experience, memory and action within place.
It is something to become aware of, not to be
taken for granted. What we do with—and in—the
places within which we dwell and raise our children
has everything to do with our humanity and our future.
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Because total and apperceptive, any accounting
of this contact as a cognitive engagement (in the
sense of determinate knowledge) is already a reduction of the original phenomenological immediacy.
The center of this total response in the artist is
called here the phenomenological core of the artist,
and this essay posits that the production of any fine
art must necessarily pass through it.

aurice Merleau-Ponty’s essay “Cezanne’s
Doubt” details the struggles of an artist
striving to produce a genuine and authentic art. Cezanne says, “the landscape thinks itself
through me … I am its consciousness.” 1 Or again,
“others … copy nature … we are attempting a piece
of it.” 2
Evident here is a certain desire, no doubt an excruciating one, in which the artist seeks to transcend
the notion of art as mimesis in order to touch a
higher reality with paint and canvas. That higher
reality is the production of art, not as a human activity by means of propositions and concepts, but
rather as an organic production of nature itself.
Building upon Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, this
essay addresses two related themes. First, a claim is
made that any production of art is at bottom complicit with the ability of the artist to allow nature to
flow through him or her, as it were, so that the resulting art object may be considered a product of
nature. In other words, it is suggested that Cezanne’s experience and his goal of producing art-asnature is not unique but typical. This claim is not
new; it is essentially a Kantian understanding of
genius in general and of the production of fine art in
particular. 3
Second, it is argued that the production of art is
a phenomenological reality in the following sense.
The art object is the material residue of a total response of the being of the artist as that being is interwoven with the “nature” (to be defined) of the
cosmos of his or her time. This total response is apperceptive and rooted in the immediate unity between artist and environment.

Merleau-Ponty on Cezanne
“Cezanne’s Doubt” is the first of three essays on art
written by Merleau-Ponty. These three essays 4 serve
as markers of the philosopher’s early, middle and
late periods. Each essay shows the growing development of the central philosophical theme of Merleau-Ponty’s work: the ontological unity of the human being’s existence and his or her experience of
the environment, and this by means of perception.
For Merleau-Ponty, existence and experience
do not constitute a duality, as perhaps Descartes
would have it; the res cogitans does not exist in a
hermetically sealed realm, deliberating and giving
definition to the res extensa. Instead, existence and
experience are one: “… my body is a thing among
things; it is one of them. It is caught in the fabric of
the world … the world is made of the very stuff of
the body...” 5
Distinct from his early Phenomenology of Perception (1945) and his posthumous The Visible and
Invisible (1964), both of which offer a general philosophy on the unity of flesh and world via perception, the three essays on art constitute the arena
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What he means is this: “nature” is more than
just the physical furniture of trees, mountains, sky,
vegetation, and so on. “Nature” includes the artist as
a piece of nature; the artist is one with the furniture
of the cosmos in a primordial way. 8 This is the first
sense of what Merleau-Ponty means by “nature.”
The second is this (and this point is reinforced
by the da Vinci example): nature is also what and
how the passage of time has made that artist. It is a
reading of history as a process of nature; not history
in some grand globalized sense, as Hegelian idealism would have it, but rather history in terms of the
intimate but perhaps seemingly unrelated details of
the artist’s life through time—all of which contribute to the emergence of the object of art in some
way.
And so da Vinci’s childhood, the attack by the
vulture in his crib, his abandonment by his father,
his obsequious devotion to his mother, and so on, all
become the stuff of “nature” that emerges in his art.

within which Merleau-Ponty explicitly addresses
the implications of his theory for the realm of art.
More specifically, his three essays on art grapple with the implications of this unity for the production of the object of art (in lieu, perhaps, of
merely addressing the experiencing of art objects).
Merleau-Ponty’s thesis is that the production of art,
if it is to be art, is necessarily a manifestation of the
unity of existence with experience: the art object is
what comes out of that unity, perhaps what erupts
out of that unity. This notion of eruption will be explained shortly.
It is in this light that we must understand Merleau-Ponty’s interest in Cezanne. He does not intend
to set Cezanne up as an unusual exception to the
general case of how art objects are produced.
To read the first essay’s summary of how
strange Cezanne was in his personal behavior
merely in this way (that is, as an unusual exception
to the general case of how art is produced) would be
to miss the point that Cezanne’s behavior, indeed
his whole life, constitute an example, an instantiation, of the kind of convolutions those preoccupied
with the production of true art all go through.
Cezanne is given as an example of a larger thesis, which is that the production of art entails a
striving of nature to find expression in material
forms. The artist that makes this possible merely
serves as the conduit, as it were, through which this
organic production passes. He or she may suffer behavioral or lifestyle challenges that others could
count as odd, in order for the “birthing” of the work
of art to take place.
This usage of Cezanne not as an exception to a
rule but rather as an exemplar of the typical case is
buttressed by the lengthy digression into the life of
Leonardo da Vinci at the end of “Cezanne’s
Doubt.” 6 That is, the passages on da Vinci constitute no digression at all; Merleau-Ponty is merely
offering another example of the typical case. Of
course, Cezanne and da Vinci do not have identical
life experiences. And we are told that every expression of nature through an artist is an unique expression made possible precisely by that artist and no
other. 7 And from this position emerges a key to
Merleau-Ponty’s profound understanding of what
“nature” means in the production of nature as art.

Kant’s Contribution
What Kant contributes to this idea of the art object
emerging from the artist as a product of nature is
found in his analysis of genius and fine art in the
Critique of Judgment. Simply put, Kant provides a
means by which to understand how the production
of art-as-nature comes about, something that Merleau-Ponty does not in fact explain.
Kant’s “critical philosophy,” of which the Critique of Judgment is a part, assesses how theoretical
knowledge, moral determinations, and aesthetic
preferences are all possible in human experience. It
gives us a glimpse—at least as Kant sees it—of the
internal human cognitive faculties and their various
operations that bring about the different modes of
human cognition and judgment (theoretical, moral
and aesthetic).
First, Kant holds that aesthetic pleasure ensues
in human experience when the human cognitive
faculties are in play. 9 This is when the faculties,
chief among them the imagination, senses that the
order of an external display 10 is in harmony with
the orderly nature of the internal faculties (which
include the faculties of understanding, of sensibility,
of the moral realm, and of course, of the imagination). Kant regards this harmony between the inter-
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produce art. The apprentice could only look to the
master’s works as models, hoping that “nature has
provided [him] with a similar proportion in his mental powers” 21 to produce original expressions of
genius.

nal human faculties and the external display as “the
whole of nature regarded as a system that includes
man as a member...” 11 There is a resonance between
this derivation and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the
unity of flesh and world.
Aesthetic play occurs because, rather than only
the faculty of understanding arriving upon a fact-ofthe-case determination (e.g., “this is a butterfly”),
the sensed external display (the butterfly) is also
presented to the faculty of imagination, 12 and an
aesthetic judgment (“this is a beautiful butterfly”)
ensues. The play of the faculties, an essentially indeterminate reality, emerges from this, and aesthetic
pleasure is the result.
Second, Kant holds that, during the play of the
faculties, due to the “purposive momentum” of that
play, aesthetic ideas 13 emerge in the faculty of
imagination. These, along with rational ideas, 14
contribute to the imagination’s tremendously powerful creative ability. 15 Indeed, Kant says that the
imagination “... is very powerful in the creation of
another nature, as it were, out of the material that
actual nature gives to it.” 16
The end result is the production of the work of
art, which, even though the object itself was produced by the artist with “a determinate intention,”
the thing looks like a production of nature, because
the faculties are able to overlook the propositional
aspect of its creation. 17
Now, Kant defines genius as “the innate mental
predisposition ... through which nature gives the
rule to art.” 18 The “rule” cannot come from the art
object itself, in which case art production would
merely be a process of copying. Nor can it come
from the artist only, in which case art would be
purely a determinate composition.
Kant therefore says that “... it must be nature in
the subject that gives the rule to art ...” 19 This is
how works of art differ from scientific discoveries.
For example, once the genius of a Newton discovers
certain scientific principles, those principles become
rules which could be used again and again by others, independent of Newton.
But the skill of the artistic genius cannot be
communicated; rather, it “dies with him, until some
day nature again endows someone else in the same
way ...” 20 Art objects, then, could never be held as
standards of imitation by others wishing also to

The Phenomenological Core
This paper now posits the phenomenological core as
the technical term that describes the locus within the
artist through which nature passes in the production
of objects of art from that artist. This notion draws
material from both Merleau-Ponty, in his specific
examples of Cezanne and da Vinci, and Kant, in his
general observations on nature’s role in the production of any fine art, to formulate a single explanatory schema.
For his part, Merleau-Ponty cites Cezanne’s
prescient statements as to what his goals in painting
were (e.g., “we are attempting a piece of nature,”
etc.) without explicitly explaining how this process
happens. On the other hand, Kant, as it were, opens
up to view the “black box” in which that precise
process takes place within the artist, but is perhaps a
little weak on offering examples. 22
The term “phenomenological core” emphasizes
the essentially phenomenological character of the
production of art. By “phenomenological” is meant
the pre-cognitive reality of the artist’s immediate
engagement with his or her surrounds. This includes
the percolations of aesthetic and rational ideas
within the artist (and Kant situates the origins of
both kinds of ideas in regions beyond the reach of
cognitive determination) 23 that contribute to the
production of objects of art from that artist.
That the art object is phenomenological may be
understood in the sense that it is possible to overlook in it the processes of determinate reason; in
other words, that it is able to communicate some of
that primordial natural character of the sources
from which it came. 24
But “phenomenological” also includes the reality of how the artist’s past, in terms of his or her
personal history through time, has uniquely defined
that artist’s ability to create art. This refers back to
Merleau-Ponty’s thesis, that even though the art object is a production of nature, nature still requires
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discussion on the production of art that both Merleau-Ponty and Kant brings to us, each in his own
way. Art emerges from the artist via that artist’s
phenomenological core.
And this emergence from the phenomenological core represents the totality of the artist’s being,
insofar as the production of art from that artist’s being is concerned. The apperceptive unity of all that
the artist is in terms of empirical concepts accrued
over time, the artist’s “secret history,” the play of all
of the faculties, the aesthetic ideas of the imagination, and so on, all contribute to an eruption that
results, mysteriously, powerfully, incomprehensibly,
in a work of art.

this particular artist to produce art in just this particular way. 25
Why is this? Again, on Kant’s explanation, aesthetic ideas are the result of the purposive momentum that is generated during aesthetic pleasure,
which is in turn the result of the mental faculties in
harmonious play. What this tells us is that the empirical concepts that reside in the faculty of understanding 26 —that faculty so essential to determinate
judgments—are nevertheless included during the
indeterminate play of the faculties in aesthetic
pleasure. This results in unique expressions of “nature” as the art object emerges.
In other words, “nature,” as it works its way
through the artist, includes the impressions of the
events of what Merleau-Ponty calls the artist’s “secret history” 27 as part of its trajectory. And so da
Vinci’s childhood experience with the vulture in his
crib becomes a fact of nature, as it were, in his particular case that is instantiated in the work Saint
Anne, the Virgin and Child. 28
Finally, the phenomenological core is apperceptive in the Kantian sense. This is a term that
Merleau-Ponty picks up on when he cites Cezanne:
“… art is a personal apperception, which I embody
in sensations and which I ask the understanding to
organize into a painting.” 29 Again, Cezanne’s insight is clear: apperception is a priori to the understanding’s task of “organizing” a painting.
What is apperception? For Kant, it is the ability
of the mental faculties to unify all external appearances into a single reality. It is the “original unchangeable consciousness” that “precedes all experience, and … makes experience possible.” 30 And
it is just because the constitution of the human faculties are able to give apperceptive unity to external
displays, without cognitively deciding to do so, that
we could say that apperceptive ability is the most
primordial connection between the human being
and nature.
This is why Cezanne wished to “forget all he
had ever learned from science…” 31 in order to be
able to create his pieces of nature; he wanted to return to the primordial natural reality, via apperception, prior to any cognitive determinations.
The phenomenological core proposed here,
then, groups all the above considerations into one
conceptual schema for the purposes of focusing the

Art as Eruption
But still, why the eruption? Given all that the mental faculties undergo in terms of aesthetic pleasure,
why does anything need to be materially expressed?
Why could not the artist merely enjoy the pleasure
within her as something of a secret and closeted joy
just for herself? Why must the pleasure result in a
public work, put forth, launched, erupted, out of her
being, ultimately going on to have a history of its
own, independent of her?
There are two answers for this, one rooted in
the nature of the internal human faculties, the other
rooted in nature as such. As to the internal faculties,
Kant tells us that it is their fundamental nature to
reach to ever larger realms of comprehension and
experience. 32
In short, human reason 33 is motivated to know
and to expand in knowledge beyond the bounds of
any current state it happens to be in. Insofar as this
necessity to expand is concerned, it is as a priori as
any formulation within the Kantian system.
Human history is replete with examples of
great leaps forward in the expansion of the human
faculties’ command of experience: consider Einstein’s relativity theory or da Vinci’s Mona Lisa.
These two examples illustrate that, at these frontiers
of reason, scientific and aesthetic boundaries tend to
become blurred and vague, even though the ideas of
the former are perhaps rooted in the faculty of understanding, while that of the latter are rooted in the
imagination.
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not knowable. We could only know appearances of
things because, by the time the sensed display is
“cognized,” our faculties have already processed it.
Hence the original “thing-in-itself” is forever
veiled. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty’s goal
was nothing but a description of how nature is able
to produce the original expression of art as a
“piece” of itself, and how the artist (e.g., a Cezanne
or a da Vinci) is able to access those mysterious
powers for the purposes of realizing this production.
How could these two factors be rectified?
Two responses could be made. The first is the
frank assessment that Kant himself became less
strict on the impossibility of knowing the “thing-initself” as his thinking evolved from the first Critique to the third. This is not to say that he ever recanted on this claim; but it is to say that the third
Critique is filled with deference to the need for the
supersensible to undergird any possibility of coherence in the realm of the knowable. 35
The second is this: for Kant, the realm of the
production of art is precisely where a connection
with the supersensible becomes necessary if a formulation for its possibility (that is, for the possibility of the production of art) is to be proposed. In
other words, for Kant, the production of art is a
phenomenological reality in the sense that MerleauPonty would have it: it is a process that is dependent
upon a pre-cognitive reality.
Kant’s words on this, unfortunately dense, nevertheless convey his point. For example, he speaks
of the harmony between the external display and the
internal faculties as experienced “a priori rather
than empirically.” He goes on: when an artist produces a figure… “[s/he] introduces the purposiveness into the figure… into [her] own way of presenting something that is given…, whatever it may
be in itself.” The artist “needs no special purpose
outside [of her] in the object to account for that purposive harmony…” And the end effect of “the presentation”—that is, the produced object—is admiration: “an entirely natural effect of that purposiveness observed in the nature of things as appearances… 36
The art object may indeed still be accessed only
as appearance, but that appearance has the indeterminate look of the supersensible to it. In this way,
the art object may be regarded as a bridge between

The eruption of art is part and parcel of this larger motivation of the human faculties to increase its
scope of knowledge and experience. It is necessarily
an attempt to communicate meaning, and not just to
privately revel in it. Perhaps, if we are to follow
Wittgenstein, it is even doubtful that a purely private meaning is even possible. Communication and
the urge to communicate are all consuming.
The second answer for the necessary eruption
of art is just the teeming life of nature itself. Kant
notes that nature is not only orderly as a system, but
it also has a purpose which is expressed as a formative force:
“… a machine has only motive force. But an organized being
has within it formative force, and a formative force that this
being imparts to the kinds of matter that lack it (thereby organizing them). This force is therefore a formative force that
propagates itself—a force that a mere ability of one thing to
move another (i.e. as mechanism) cannot explain…” 34

What Kant is saying is that the organic beings
of nature, chief among them the human being, do
not only exist in and as nature; they also have an
ability to produce nature as part and parcel of their
existence. In short, trees grow, birds hatch, humans
produce art. It is an amazing thing to note that every
human culture produces art as an unreflective necessity of its existence. Objects of art are always
already there, as evidence of the fact of human existence in the cosmos.
The phenomenological core, then, is a single
conceptual schema that intersects all of the Kantian
faculties but is not resident exclusively in any one
of them. It is a name given to the total sum of the
set of factors, resident within the human subject,
that contribute towards the emergence of a work of
art from the being of the artist. It is through the
phenomenological core that nature works to find
expression in art.

A Phenomenological Bridge
The irony must be noted in this coupling of Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of Cezanne and da Vinci with
Kant’s aesthetic theory. Kant’s aesthetic theory resides in that larger system which he has called the
critical philosophy. This system posits the wellknown Kantian position that the “thing-in-itself” is
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the determinate realm and the indeterminate, perhaps even the noumenal, realm.
What Kant means to say in all of this, then, is
simply that his aesthetic theory could account for art
as a production of nature through the being of the
artist. Even though the end result is still an appearance of the art object, it is nevertheless entirely a
natural effect because it was entirely a natural process. And that is why we admire works of art. 37
The point is that the process bypasses, or at
least trumps, any primary dependence upon cognitive reductions in the understanding only. Instead, it
is able to harness the connections to the supersensible deep within the human faculties.
What Merleau-Ponty clarifies by giving us the
examples of Cezanne and da Vinci is that this connection to the supersensible is synonymous with a
connection to nature. And so the artist strives to be
“nature’s consciousness,” and the end product of
that striving is a piece of nature.
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